Taking its cue from the US Supreme Court judgment in Kiobel that restricted the extraterritorial reach of the Alien Tort Claims Act, this article explores how sovereignty structures the relationship between global resource exploitation and the localization of human rights in the international order of states. The argument situates international human rights law in an area of tension between national political self-determination and the global economic exploitation of natural resources. Global business operations in resource-rich developing countries undermine the protective role of sovereignty in relation to political self-determination that once justified the confinement of human rights to the territorial state legal order. At the same time, jurisdiction as an expression of sovereignty restricts access to justice for victims of extraterritorial human rights violations in Western home states of 'multi-national' corporations.
I shall return to Kiobel in later sections of this article, yet my main concern is not with the particulars of the judgment or with its broader ramifications for future ATCA litigationsissues that have already received considerable attention in academic scholarship and human rights advocacy circles. 9 Rather, I want to examine how the concerns with sovereignty that informed the US Supreme Court judgment in Kiobel reflect on the relationship between the global exploitation of natural resources and the confinement of human rights protection to the territorial state legal order. This examination entails scrutinizing jurisdictional constraints imposed on transnational tort litigation for human rights violations (traditionally, the domain of private international law) from the perspective of state obligations to provide access to justice under public international human rights law.
It is widely accepted that international human rights treaties impose (positive) obligations on states to protect human rights in the relationship between private actors, which includes obligations to ensure effective civil remedies for human rights violations committed by nonstate actors. According to the UN Human Rights Committee, for example, a state's human 6 Ibid., at 25. 7 Kiobel, supra note 1, at 12. 8 Ibid., at 14; in caso, the 'presence' of the defendants in the USA consisted of an office in New York owned by an affiliated corporation tasked with explaining Shell business to potential investors. 9 Indeed, the role of state sovereignty in framing access to justice for victims of extraterritorial corporate human rights violations is not particular to cases brought under ATCA, see, e.g., In Re Union Carbide Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal India, Opinion and Order, 634 F Supp. 842 (SDNY 1986 10 However, and even though international human rights treaties do not explicitly confine human rights obligations to state territory, 11 states have been reluctant to accept an extension of these obligations to victims of corporate human rights violations located abroad. One important reason for this reluctance, or so I shall argue, relates to the role of sovereignty in framing the relationship between human rights protection and national political self-determination in the territorial state legal order.
The second section of this article traces states' reluctance to accept extraterritorial human rights obligations in the process of de-colonization after the Second World War. Human rights became intertwined with struggles for permanent sovereignty over natural resources (PSNR) that aimed at shielding the newly independent states in the developing world from external economic and political interference. In this process, state sovereignty assumed a protective role in relation to human rights conceived as an expression of national political self-determination.
As Samuel Moyn notes, 'in fidelity to earlier Euro-American conceptions of rights, anticolonialism prioritized the independence and autonomy of the new nation as the form in which rights had to be won'. The decolonization movement thus tied human rights to 'the installation of sovereignty across the world, in a period of historically unparalleled triumph for the concept and its practices'.
12
The third section of this article dwells on Nigeria's 'resource curse' to examine the impacts of global business operations on human rights protection in resource-rich developing countries. I argue that the global economic exploitation of Nigeria's oil and gas resources has eroded the protective role of sovereignty in relation to national political self-determination that once justified the confinement of human rights to the territorial state. Against this background, the fourth and fifth sections scrutinize in more detail the political and legal dimensions of the sovereignty objection to extraterritorial human rights protection in relation to 'multinational'
corporations. In regard to the former, extraterritorial human rights protection is said to unduly interfere with the domestic politics of other states and to decouple the realization of human rights from the political process vested in the sovereign state legal order. In regard to the latter, the rules of jurisdiction under public international law aim to protect the sovereign rights that states wield over their territory and people therein by delimiting states' competences to adjudicate human rights violations committed outside their borders.
The final section of this article advances a defence of extraterritorial human rights protection as a way to legally and politically account for the human rights impacts of global resource exploitation. I contend that transnational tort litigation for corporate human rights violations should be appraised in light of states' human rights obligations to ensure effective civil remedies for victims located outside their borders. The normative concern behind this territorial extension of international human rights obligations is less the satisfaction of pecuniary interests through private litigation than empowering victims of human rights violations to stake a public and political claim in the Western home states of 'multinational' corporations.
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources
In December 1962, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) adopted Resolution 1803 on the Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources. Considering that 'any measure in this respect must be based on the recognition of the inalienable right of all states freely to dispose of their natural wealth and resources in accordance with their national interests, and on respect for the economic independence of states', the UNGA declared that 'the right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources must be exercised in the interest of their national development and of the well-being of the people of the state concerned'.
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This free and beneficial exercise of sovereignty over natural resources, in turn, was to be 'furthered by the mutual respect of states based on their sovereign equality'. The wave of decolonization in the 1960s that populated the developing world with newly independent countries progressively shifted the subject of PSNR from self-determining peoples to sovereign states. As Nico Schrijver says, 'this change of emphasis resulted from the relatively rapid decolonisation process, the way in which newly independent states cherished their sovereignty, and the non-representation of peoples in the intergovernmental United Yet PSNR also represented an attempt on the part of newly independent and other developing states to achieve national political self-determination within their own territorial borders. While 'many in the Third World believed the key to economic independence lay in national ownership of the available forms of production', such a strategy also 'seemed to offer both the possibility of subordinating the economic to the political sphere and the possibility of rejecting foreign domination'. 22 The route to national political self-determination was pursued through the development of international human rights law. 23 In this vein, common Taking notice of 'the numerous laws passed to regulate the extractive oil and gas industry …
[and] the creation of agencies to ensure the implementation of the legislation', the Court concluded that 'the core of the problem in tackling the environmental degradation in the Region of Niger Delta resides in the lack of enforcement of the legislation and regulation in force'.
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Yet in spite of the apparent failure of the Nigerian state to protect its people against the human rights and environmental impacts of the exploitation of its natural resources, neither judicial body contemplated the human rights accountability of those (Western) states in which the oil multinationals are headquartered and from where they steer and control their global business operations. Rather, it is considered Nigeria's sole legal responsibility to prevent and redress corporate human rights violations within its own sovereign borders.
The Sovereignty Objection to Extraterritorial Human Rights Protection
In the second section of this article, I argued that during decolonization, human rights became intertwined with the struggles of developing countries to secure political control over the economic exploitation of their natural resources. In this process, state sovereignty assumed a protective role in relation to human rights conceived as an expression of national political self- Klabbers' second objection dwells on the republican concern that courts may be ill-suited to protect human rights in a democratic polity -a concern that applies a fortiori to courts situated outside the state legal order: While these objections to extraterritorial human rights protection should not be discarded lightly, they arguably underestimate the extent to which the doctrine of state sovereignty has come under strain from two different directions: the advent of the international 'age of rights'
and intensified patterns of global economic cooperation and competition. In regard to the former, both Cohen's and Klabbers' justification for containing human rights protection within the sovereign state draws on a qualified notion of national political self-determination that has already internalized Western values of liberal democracy. 69 However, once sovereign equality becomes qualified by a substantive notion of political self-determination imbued with human rights, Cohen's critique of extraterritorial human rights protection as an 'imperial right' loses much of its force. In regard to the latter, the protection of a domestic niche for politics from 'mundane' economic matters is bought at the price of localizing political control over the economic sphere in the sovereign state legal order. At the same time, the formalization of sovereign equality on the grounds of national political self-determination entails that international law could and should turn a blind eye on substantive economic inequalities 66 Ibid., at 559. 67 Cohen, supra note 57, at 502. 68 Klabbers, supra note 63, at 561. 69 The liberal-republican roots of Klabbers' argument are unmistakable. For Cohen, sovereign equality is bound up with 'the values of political plurality and political autonomy' as 'the precondition for democracy'. Cohen, supra note 57, at 498. between states. 70 However, the political rationale behind Klabbers' confinement of human rights to the sovereign state is subverted once national political self-determination becomes colonized by the economic imperatives of global resource exploitation, as in the case of Nigeria.
Nigeria's inability to prevent and redress human rights violations committed in the course of the exploitation of its natural oil and gas resources has translated into violent conflicts that have created systemic obstacles to the realization of political self-determination within the Shell is also said to have contributed to fuelling conflict by disregarding its own operational procedures and corporate policies and exploiting loopholes in domestic regulation to the detriment of human, animal and plant life in the affected communities. 73 Moreover:
[a] lack of transparency in the award of compensation and clean-up contracts has fed inter-and intra-community tensions and conflict. Communities are often seen and treated as a 'risk' to be pacified, rather than as stakeholders with critical concerns about the impact of oil operations. The risk-based approach to communities underpins several damaging strategies in the Niger Delta. Some companies have effectively paid communities and youths off, hoping to prevent 70 On this 'mutual containment' between political sovereign state equality and economic inequality, see further Kingsbury, supra note 28, at 600. 71 Amnesty International, Nigeria, supra note 38, at 13. 72 Obi, 'Oil Extraction, Dispossession, Resistance, and Conflict in Nigeria's Oil-Rich Niger Delta', 30 Canadian Journal of Development Studies (2010) 219, at 230. 73 In this regard, the 2011 UNEP report concludes 'that the control, maintenance and decommissioning of oilfield infrastructure in Ogoniland are inadequate'; that 'industry best practices and SPDC's own procedures have not been applied, creating public safety issues' and that 'while new changes are an improvement, they still do not meet the local regulatory requirements or international best practices'. UNEP, supra note 38, at 12. Philip Liste has recently pointed to the 'problematic spatial circularity' at work in Kiobel that also besets arguments in favour of confining human rights to the sovereign territorial state:
'Although deeply involved in the production of space, the court presents territory as physically given. Territory is thus 'naturalised' and, in so doing, a veil is drawn over the political nature of social space'. 114 There is a lively doctrinal debate about the extraterritorial application of international human rights treaties that concerns, among others, the precise requirements of human rights jurisdiction, the distinction between jurisdiction and state responsibility, the role of attribution in relation to both and the problem of causation. 115 While undoubtedly important, this debate should not distract from the underlying political concerns. Doctrinal arguments about the conditions under which a state can be held legally accountable for extraterritorial human rights violations reflect normative judgments about the appropriate role of human rights in construing an agency relationship between that state and an individual located outside its borders. Moreover, extraterritorial human rights protection is not merely, perhaps not even primarily, about the satisfaction of pecuniary damages but should also be seen as part of a broader project to reconfigure the legal and political landscape of the 'late' Westphalian world.
In the case of Nigeria, where human rights protection and political self-determination have been eroded by the economic imperatives of global resource exploitation, the retreat behind the veil of state sovereignty degenerates into a real-political charade. 117 At the same time, unless corroborated by states' acceptance of extraterritorial legal human rights accountability, recent policy commitments to 'business and human rights' in the developed world may still reveal themselves as simply a new form of 'imperial right' that instrumentalises human well-being in the service of economic self-interest. 118 Either way, the 'paradise' of the sovereign state as a self-contained and self-determining legal and political organization -if it was ever more than a utopian promise -is irrevocably lost. 117 In this context, it should not go unnoticed that while Nigeria did not object to US jurisdiction in Kiobel, the Dutch government's contribution to the joined amicus curiae was reportedly written upon the request from, and with the assistance of, Royal Dutch Shell. See F. Vuijst and T. Scheltema, 'Hoe Nederland Shell helpt', Vrij Nederland (8 February 2013). 118 Cohen, supra note 57.
